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SPAMMERS CLOG IN-BOXES
EVERYWHERE:
WILL THE CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003
HALT THE INVASION?
INTRODUCTION
Unsolicited commercial email ("spam"') imposes substantial
costs on all participants in the electronic mail system and invades
the privacy of recipients. Recognizing the need to shift the costs
of advertising and increase the privacy of email users, Congress
enacted the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.2 The legislation, however,
lacks bite to deal effectively with the problems spawned from
spam. It particularly fails to stop spammers from invading the pri-
vacy of Americans. A significant reduction in spam and the corre-
sponding invasion of privacy will ensue only with a combination
of market-based initiatives and protective legislation.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH SPAM
A. Spam Imposes Substantial Costs on Email Users
Spam has become an enormous problem costing individuals
and businesses a significant amount of time and money. Spam
currently accounts for more than half of all email traffic. 3 Ameri-
cans spent an estimated $10 billion this year taking care of the
I The name "spam" derived from a Monty Python comedy bit in which the word was re-
peated to the point of absurdity in a restaurant menu. See CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promo-
tions, Inc., 962 F. Supp 1015, 1018 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
2 CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 Report of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transpor-
tation on S.877, S. REP. No. 108-102, at 12-13 (2003) [hereinafter Legislative History], avail-
able at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/108publ.html. The full text of the CAN-SPAM
Act of 2003 can be found at Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Market-
ing Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (Dec. 16, 2003) [hereinafter CAN-SPAM
Act], available at www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/1 08publ.html.
3 Jennifer Lee, House Accepts Revisions on Antispam Bill, N.Y. TtMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at
CIO.
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abundance of unwanted electronic messages;4 productivity losses
accounted for nearly $4 billion of that total. 5 "The average worker
receives 13.3 spam messages a day, which takes six and a half
minutes to process. Do the math and that comes to 1.4 percent of
their productive time."6 Additionally, many business travelers and
individuals living in rural areas incur either long distance fees or
per minute surcharges when accessing the Internet.7 Deleting
spam thus imposes substantial direct costs on recipients in the
form of both time and money.
Further indirect costs attributable to spam include machine re-
sources, network bandwidth, and user fees.8 Internet service pro-
viders ("ISPs") spend on annual labor, additional bandwidth, and
software aimed at filtering spam out of networks and out of cus-
tomers' in-boxes.9 Every computer accessed in the transmission of
a spare message uses time and energy to process that message; this
time and energy takes away from each computer's ability to proc-
ess other legitimate tasks.'0 Spam messages also clog the channels
between machines and cause the entire Internet to operate at a
slower pace." ISPs thus incur significant costs in combating and
processing this offensive marketing technique. These costs trickle
down to each and every person who uses the Internet-an esti-
mated 140 million Americans'2-since Internet users subsidize
spam and its prevention through their subscription fees. Research
indicates that fighting spam adds an average of $2 per month to an
individual's Internet bills. 13  On a global level, spam has had a
similar effect and cost individuals an estimated $20.5 billion this
past year. 14
Spammers, on the other hand, bear a very low cost burden.
They pay as little as 0.025 cents per email message due in part to
the inexpensive methods used to compile address lists. 15 Deirdre
Mulligan testified before Congress:
4 Saul Hansell, Totalling up the Bill for Spam, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at Cl.
5 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 7.
6 Hansell, supra note 4 (quoting Rebecca Wettemmann, research director of Nucleus).
7 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 7.
8 CURTIS D. FRYE, PRIVACY-ENHANCED BUSINESS: ADAPTING TO THE ONLINE ENVI-
RONMENT 25 (2001).
9 Carol Jones, Email Solicitation: Will Opening a "Spam-Free" Mailbox Ever Be a Real-
ity? 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 69, 71 (2002).
10 FRYE, supra note 8, at 25.
I11 /d.
12 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 2.
'3 Id. at 6.
14 Hansell, supra note 4 (referring to a study by the Radicati Group).
5 Id. Notably, spammers obtain email lists using various techniques. In a "dictionary at-
tack" the spammer reels in masses of computer generated potential email names to see which
ones bite. "Harvesting" email addresses involves the use of software programs that crawl
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It is much less expensive to send bulk email than conven-
tional mail. Each additional piece of conventional mail re-
quires both another paper copy and additional postage. With
email, however, the only cost to the sender is typing one
more email address into the recipient list. The true cost of
bulk email is shifted to other parties, such as the sender's ISP,
the recipients' ISPs, and the recipients themselves. The
sender never bears the additional costs imposed on the ISPs
and the recipients.
16
In addition, spam routinely contains some form of false or
misleading information and consistently offends recipients by
pushing investment scams, pornography, or pills. The Federal
Trade Commission found that sixty-six percent of all spam con-
tains false, fraudulent, or misleading information somewhere in the
email's routing information, subject line, or message content. 17
Regarding the subject matter of spam messages, twenty percent of
the messages promote "get-rich-quick" schemes, eighteen percent
contain sexually explicit content, seventeen percent offer credit
card deals, and ten percent push health care products and ser-
vices.'8 Upon consideration of the enormous costs and objection-
able content imposed by spammers on Internet users, it becomes
evident that this problem cannot continue.
B. Spam Invades the Privacy of Individuals
"A man's home is his castle into which not even the
king may enter.,"19
Various cultures differ in their perspective on acceptable lev-
els of personal space. Travel throughout Europe, the Middle East,
Asia, and the United States and notice the varying norms of prox-
imity. Personal space transcends the physical world. Varying cul-
tures tolerate a range of personal space with respect to tangible as
well as intangible space, including information like medical re-
through Web pages looking for the "@" symbol and record the type to the left and right of the
symbol to put addresses together. Jack Hitt, Confessions ofa Spam King, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2003, § 6, at 48. To identify active email accounts, many spam messages contain "web bugs" or
other technological mechanisms that notify the spammer when a recipient has opened a mes-
sage. Legislative History, supra note 2, at 4.
16 Sabra-Anne Kelin, State Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Email, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 435, 437 n.l 1 (2001) (identifying Deirdre Mulligan as Staff Counsel for the Center
for Democracy and Technology).
17 Id. at 2.
18 Id. at 4.
'9 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (quotations omitted) (citing
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
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cords, credit histories, and financial documents. 20  Like the territo-
rial art of the wild animal, the invisible boundary dividing personal
from community space demands recognition and respect. Such a
boundary provides a sense of comfort and security. The flouting
of personal space evokes a sense of violation and assault. The in-
vasion of one's personal space annihilates privacy. 21  Email in-
boxes constitute personal space.22 Spam functions to invade email
in-boxes and therefore violates the privacy of email users.
Spam infringes on individuals' right to privacy, their right "to
be let alone." In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,
the United States Supreme Court recognized an individual's right
"to be let alone" and held that a mailer's right to communicate had
to stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee. Appellants
challenged the constitutionality of a statute that, in effect, banned
sexually explicit mailings on the basis of First Amendment free
speech.24 In response, the Court pointed to the necessity that the
right "to be let alone" must balance with the right of others to
communicate. 25  "[I]ndividual autonomy must survive to permit
every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail. 26 The
Court relied on the ancient concept that "'a man's home is his cas-
tle' into which 'not even the king may enter.' ' 27 Accordingly, the
statute served to protect individuals' privacy and passed constitu-
tional muster. The Court stated:
20 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Privacy and Human Rights: An International
Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice, at www.gilc.org/privacy/survey (providing details on the
state of privacy laws in several countries throughout the world) (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
21 "Privacy is a limitation on the access of one or more entities to an entity that possesses
experience." DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 16 (1979) (quoting
Roland Garrett, The Nature of Privacy, 18 PHIL. TODAY 263, 264 (1974)). One compromises
another's privacy when he or she gains unwelcome access to another's experiences or engage-
ments. One type of invasion of privacy refers to an intrusion upon one of an individual's en-
gagements that influences that person's enjoyment of such engagement. Another type of inva-
sion of privacy occurs when one gains unsolicited access to another through the accumulation
and disclosure of personal information. In either case, individuals seek redress through litiga-
tion or the political process, leaving the government to decide what comprises an invasion of
privacy, whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, and whether government protection
best serves the public interest. Id. at 18.
22 See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. AOL, 948 F. Supp. 436, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that he had a right to send bulk commercial email to AOL customers be-
cause the online service qualified as a "company town" for purposes of access to its subscribers
since the service did not perform any traditionally municipal or essential public services).
23 Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
24 That statute allowed individuals to "opt-out" of future sexually explicit mailings by pro-
viding the postal service with notice of such intention. Id. at 729.
5 Id.
26 Id. at 726.
27 Id. at 737 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
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In effect, Congress has erected a wall-or more accurately
permits a citizen to erect a wall-that no advertiser may
penetrate without his acquiescence. The continuing operative
effect of a mailing ban once imposed presents no constitu-
tional obstacles; the citizen cannot be put to the burden of de-
termining on repeated occasions whether the offending
mailer has altered its material so as to make it acceptable.
Nor should the householder have to risk that offensive mate-
rial come into the hands of children before it can be
stopped.28
The Court rejected the argument that a vendor has a right to send
unwanted mail into the home of another:29 "[N]o one has a right to
press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient. 30 Even though
our Constitution guarantees a right to free speech, individuals do
not have to endure objectionable speech within the sanctuary of
the home. Thus, the right of the mailer stops at the outer boundary
of every person's domain.3'
Similarly, the right of the spammer to communicate must stop
at the outer boundary of every person's domain. The sanctuary of
the home in the Rowan case subsumed the mailbox. A mailbox
and an email in-box are analogous in that they serve the same pur-
pose-to facilitate communication. Both function to send and re-
ceive communications. Moreover, individuals maintain a higher
expectation of privacy with regard to email addresses due to the
nonexistence of an email address directory similar to a phone
book. Email addresses maintain anonymity, and certainly are not a
matter of public record. Each recipient needs a password to access
an in-box in cyberspace just as one needs a key to enter a domain
in physical space. An in-box, however intangible, must therefore
be considered part of the home and enjoy at least the same pro-
tected status as the mailbox. It follows that no one has the right to
impose ideas on unwilling recipients in the sanctuary of their email
in-box. Spammers do not have a basic right to send unsolicited
commercial emails to individuals' in-boxes. Consequently, spam
encroaches upon the personal space of individuals and violates
their right "to be let alone," their right to be free from objection-
able intrusion, their right to privacy.
Even without reliance upon the analogy between mail and
email, email inboxes constitute personal, rather than community,
28 Id. at 738.
29 Id.
3 Id.
31 Id.
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space and thus enjoy privacy protection. In CompuServe Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc., an ISP sought to enjoin a spammer from
sending unsolicited commercial email to its subscribers based on a
trespass to chattels claim. 32 The ISP asserted that the volume of
messages generated by mass mailings placed a substantial burden
on its equipment and storage capacity.33  Further, defendant
spammers ignored the ISP's notification that they were prohibited
from continuing such activity and disregarded the ISP's request to
cease and desist from sending unsolicited email to its subscribers.
In fact, the defendant spammers modified their equipment and
messages to circumvent the ISP's filtering software.34 The ISP in
CompuServe asserted that such action constituted a trespass upon
its personal property. The court agreed, holding that "[t]he use of
personal property exceeding consent is a trespass. 35 Electronic
signals generated and sent by computer have been held to be suffi-
ciently physically tangible to support a trespass cause of action.36
Moreover, the court distinguished ISPs from common carriers and
public utilities in response to the defendant's argument that the
electronic access way was public property. 37 Given the determina-
tion that ISPs maintain private property, email in-boxes must
therefore constitute personal private property rather than commu-
nity or public property.
Furthermore, in Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. AOL, a federal dis-
trict court rejected an argument that the ISP acted as a municipal-
ity and found that AOL had the right to prevent spammers from
reaching its subscribers over the Internet. 38 Defendant spammers
alleged that AOL's conduct had the character of state action to
support that AOL had to respect their right to free speech.3 9 They
compared AOL's Internet email services to those of a company
town, which the Supreme Court had previously held performed a
public function.4 The court, however, distinguished AOL from a
company town. AOL did not exercise any "municipal powers or
public services traditionally exercised by the State.' Even
though AOL "technically" availed its email system to the public by
32 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
33 Id. at 1019.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1024.
36 Id. at 1021.
37 Id. at 1025-28.
38 Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 442 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946)).
39 Id. at441.
40 ld.
41 Id. at 442.
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connecting with the Internet, it did not open its property to the
public by performing functions typically reserved for a municipal-
ity or State.42 AOL's Internet email connection did not constitute
an exclusive public function because several alternatives to email
existed for commercial communication, such as the World Wide
Web, U.S. mail, telemarketing, television, cable, newspapers,
magazines, and leaflets.43 Email in-boxes correspondingly consti-
tute personal, rather than community, space and thus enjoy a right
to privacy.
II. CAN-SPAM ACT
Congress acknowledged the importance of email and realized
the insidious abuse by spammers through the passage of the CAN-
SPAM Act, effective January 1, 2004.44 In recognizing that many
spammers purposely mislead recipients and often disguise their
identity, Congress aimed to curb the widespread exploitation of the
email system. 45 Congress set forth the rationale behind the law:
there is a substantial government interest in regulating commercial
email on a national level; spammers should not mislead recipients
as to the source or content of electronic messages; and recipients
of commercial email have the right to decline additional spam
messages.46
The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits predatory and abusive com-
mercial email. The law penalizes individuals who knowingly en-
gage in the following behavior:
1) accessing a protected computer without authorization
and intentionally initiating the transmission of multiple
commercial email messages through that computer;
2) sending several multiple commercial email messages
with the intent to deceive or mislead recipients, or any Inter-
net access service, as to the origin of such messages;
3) materially falsifying header information in several
commercial emails and intentionally initiating the transmis-
sion of such messages;
4) registering for five or more email accounts or online
user accounts or two or more domain names using a false
42 Id.
43 Id. at 443.
44 CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (Dec. 16, 2003).
41 Id. § 2(a).
- Id. § 2(b).
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identification and intentionally sending spain from such ac-
counts or domain names;
5) falsely representing oneself to be the registrant of five
or more Internet Protocol addresses and intentionally initiat-
ing the transmission of spam.47
For participating in the above activities, an individual can face up
to five years in jail and $6 million in fines.48
The Act contains an "opt-out" provision requiring commercial
email messages to include a functioning return email address that a
recipient may use to opt-out of future spam from the sender.49 The
email address provided must remain active for at least thirty days
after the transmission of the original message. ° Once a consumer
effectively chooses to opt-out of future email messages, the sender
must respect the decision. It will thereafter be unlawful for the
initial sender or anyone acting on such person's behalf to transmit,
or to assist in the transmission of, a commercial email message
upon the expiration of ten business days after the receipt of the
opt-out notice. 51 The initial sender and any person with knowledge
of the opt-out request must refrain from selling, leasing, exchang-
ing, or transferring the recipient's email address. 52 In addition,
commercial email messages must provide clear and conspicuous
identification that the message is an advertisement or solicitation,
notice of the opportunity to decline to receive further messages,
and a valid physical postal address of the sender.53
The Act also prohibits harvesting and dictionary attacks 54 and
requires individuals to place warning labels on commercial emails
containing sexually oriented material. 55 Email messages contain-
ing sexually explicit content must include in the subject line the
marks or notices prescribed by the FTC.56 Such messages must
further ensure that the message when initially opened contains
only the content required by the "opt-out" provision and instruc-
tions on how to access the sexually explicit material, unless the
sender receives the prior affirmative consent of the recipient.57 An
47 Id. § 4(a).
41 Id. §§ 4(b), 7(f)(3)(A)-(D).
41 Id. §§ 5(a)(3)-(4).
10 Id. § 5(a)(3)(A)(ii).
511 Id. §§ 5(a)(4)(A)(i)-(iii).
52 Id. § 5(a)(4)(A)(iv).
11 Id. § 5(a)(5).
54 Id. § 5(b)(I); see supra note 15 (explaining "harvesting" and "dictionary attacks").
55 Id. § 5(d).
56 Id. §§ 5(d)(1)(a), 5(d)(3).
17 Id. §§ 5(d)(1)(B), 5(d)(2).
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individual in violation of this provision can face up to five years in
jail and/or fines.58
The CAN-SPAM Act limits the role of the states in combating
spam. Enforcement actions lie primarily in the hands of the FTC.5 9
State attorneys general can bring civil actions to seek injunctions
or to obtain damages only if the alleged violation threatens the in-
terests of a resident of the particular state.6° The CAN-SPAM Act
preempts or supersedes state laws that expressly deal with com-
mercial emails. 61 States can only prohibit false and deceptive
commercial email messages and can regulate issues such as com-
62puter crime, tort, and trespass.
Congress also called for the FTC to submit reports about the
effects of spam. Within six months of the effectiveness of Section
9, the FTC must present Congress with a report outlining a plan for
the establishment of a national Do-Not-Email registry. 63 The re-
port must include a timetable for implementation, an explanation
of all FTC concerns, and an explanation of how such a registry
would apply to children with email accounts. 64 The Act authorizes
the FTC to implement a Do-Not-Email registry nine months from
the date of enactment of Section 9.65 By January 2006, the FTC
must further submit a report assessing the effectiveness and en-
forcement of the provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act.66 The report
must include an analysis of the state of technology and the market
in reference to the law, analysis and recommendations on how to
eliminate spam on an international level, and analysis and recom-
mendations on how to protect children from obscene or porno-
67graphic commercial email messages.
A. Strengths of the CAN-SPAM Act
In response to the widespread spam problem, Congress impor-
tantly recognized a substantial government interest in creating a
solution to the spain problem through the passage of the CAN-
SPAM Act. This legislative action enjoyed rare overwhelming
11 Id. § 5(d)(5).
59 Id. § 7(a).
60 Id. § 7(f).
61 Id. § 8(b).
62 Id. § 8(b).
63 Id. § 9(a).
64 Id. § 9(a). Section 16 sets the effective date as January 1, 2004, for all provisions ex-
cept section 9.
65 Id. § 9(b).
66 Id. § 10(a).
67 Id. § 10(b).
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68bipartisan support, which signals legislative commitment to the
issue and understanding of the severity of the problem. Given the
overwhelming consistency in prior case law, the CAN-SPAM Act
supports the individual's right "to be let alone" in balancing pri-
vacy with free speech rights and thus accords with the framework
of the Constitution. 69 The CAN-SPAM Act will beneficially serve
to deter spammers from sending fraudulent or misleading email
messages, from concealing their identity, and from using obtrusive
methods to collect email addresses. Email users will be able to
identify spam messages as advertisements generally and as porno-
graphic messages specifically due to the provisions of the Act.
Congress identified the key issues regarding spam in calling for
FTC reports analyzing a Do-Not-Email List, internationally har-
monized legislation, and greater protection of children from the
harms of obscene and pornographic commercial messages. Thus,
the CAN-SPAM Act serves a valid and useful purpose in initiating
legislative action, which will serve to stop spam, increase privacy
of U.S. citizens with respect to their email in-boxes, and relieve
them from the burdens of paying for unwanted advertising.
B. Weaknesses of the CAN-SPAM Act
"The bill doesn't can spare, it legalizes it ... it is full of
loopholes. It's difficult to enforce. It's weaker
than many state laws. ,7
0
The CAN-SPAM Act does not create an effective solution to
the enormous spam problem because it allows spammers to invade
in-boxes, forces spain recipients to take an affirmative act to cur-
tail future invasions, provides lenient requirements and inadequate
enforcement mechanisms, voids stricter state anti-spam laws, and
puts off the need for a global solution. Despite Congressional ac-
knowledgment of the spam problem, recognition of the substantial
government interest in remedying such a problem, and the biparti-
san support for this federal anti-spain legislation,7' Congress con-
ceded to special interest groups and denied consumers adequate
protection from such invasive marketing techniques.72 Unified
68 See Voting Record, 2003 H. ROLL No. 671 (Nov. 21, 2003); 2003 SEN. VOTE No. 404
(Oct. 22, 2003), available at www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/roll-call-vote-cfm.
cfm?congress=108&session=1 &vote=00404.
69 See supra Part I.B.
70 Jennifer Lee, Antispam Bill Passes Senate by Voice Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at
C3 (quoting California State Senator Debra Bowen).
71 Voting Record, supra note 68.
72 Jennifer Lee, Bush Signs Law Placing Curbs on Bulk Commercial Email, N.Y. TIMES,
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public opinion against spam motivated some sort of legislative ac-
tion, albeit impotent. Anti-spain bills floated around Congress for
four years before the adoption of the law,7 3 and the law passed
only after marketing organizations hopped on board to lobby for
the weakest form of regulation. 74  The CAN-SPAM Act serves
more as lip service to denote the government's identification of a
widespread problem, rather than an effective solution to a costly
and invasive problem.
The debate around spam legislation focuses on two conflicting
approaches, the "opt-in" and the "opt-out" mechanisms.75 The
"opt-in" approach requires that all spammers obtain express per-
mission before transmitting any email addresses. 76 The more leni-
ent "opt-out" approach allows spammers to send messages as long
as each message offers a legitimate link from which one can re-
quest that the spammer refrain from sending future emails. 77 Con-
gress favors the "opt-out" approach because it provides marketers
and businesses with the most breathing room.78
The "opt-out" method of regulation, however, fails to protect
the privacy of individuals.79 It allows uninvited and unwelcome
messages to infiltrate in-boxes in homes and businesses, and then
provides an antidote available for every infliction at the expense of
the victim's time and money. Individual recipients are forced to
take an affirmative step against each piece of unwanted mail; such
step wastes more time and money than the problem itself. By im-
plementing the "opt-out" approach, Congress has simply devel-
oped a medicine to treat the symptoms of spam, an elective treat-
ment that imposes additional costs on individuals. Individuals
need not a cumbersome and repetitive serum to counter spam. In-
dividuals need Congress to stand up for the integrity of privacy by
choosing a method that will eradicate the plague of spam that in-
fects the worldwide email system.
In terms of privacy, the "opt-in" approach protects consumers
in a significantly greater and more effective manner. The "opt-in"
approach prohibits unsolicited intrusions and requires that spam-
Dec. 17, 2003, at C4; see also Congressional Spain Filter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at A18.
13 Cong. Info. Serv., Inc., Bill Tracking Report, 108th Cong., Ist Sess., U.S. Senate, at
LEXIS, 2003 Bill Tracking S. 877.
74 Congressional Spam Filter, supra note 72.
75 Hitt, supra note 15.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 17-18.
79 See David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Commercial
Email, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 352-55 (2000) (offering a brief analysis of the "opt-out" approach
and concluding it an ineffective method to curb sparn).
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mers send invited messages only. Like a vaccine prevents a dis-
ease, the "opt-in" approach stops the widespread dissemination of
spain. Rather than imposing the costs of the remedy on all email
users for each uninvited message like the "opt-out" approach, the
"opt-in" approach imposes costs on spammers and those interested
in receiving spam. In other words, it shifts the burden of spam
onto spammers. Spammers must ask permission to enter an in-box
instead of entering and then being asked to leave. The "opt-in"
approach would ultimately serve to reduce the enormous volume
of contamination clogging networks and flooding the email sys-
tem, and would halt the widespread waste of time and money di-
rected at eliminating spam. Congress must adopt the "opt-in" ap-
proach to protect the privacy of email users and cure the disease
infecting in-boxes-spam.
A Do-Not-Email list would perhaps quell many of the defects
of the "opt-out" approach by arriving at an outcome similar to that
of the "opt-in" approach-the widespread eradication of unsolic-
ited email. This approach provides consumers with the ability to
opt-out of all spam by registering their email addresses and, argua-
bly, will result in a widespread reduction in spam. Opponents of
the Do-Not-Email list idea, however, contend that such list would
not elicit the results garnered by the do-not-call list because most
spammers are illegitimate and crooked individuals unlikely to
comply with any list.80 Furthermore, a do-not-spam list would
prove expensive to administer and vulnerable to hackers. 81 The
FTC agrees that a do-not-spam list would be difficult to administer
and enforce and thus not very useful or effective in the fight
against spam.82 Nevertheless, such an approach will not take ef-
fect in the near future anyway since the FTC has ample time to
consider a Do-Not-Email list and submit its findings to Congress.83
The CAN-SPAM Act sidesteps the need for an internationally
harmonized solution to spain by allowing the FTC two years to
study the issue. The FTC has until January 2006 to analyze poten-
tial global solutions and make a recommendation to Congress on
how to eliminate spam across the worldwide email system.84
80 Saul Hansell, The Bandwagon to Fight Spam Hits a Bump, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003,
at Cl.
81 Id.
82 See FTC Chief Doubtful of Antispam Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at C30
("A do-not-spam registry would be impossible to enforce, [Timothy J. Muffs, FrC Chairman]
said, because the senders of such email messages generally conceal their identities."); see also
Hansell, supra note 80 ("Most span is already clearly so illegitimate that senders are not likely
to comply." (quoting J. Howard Beales HI, Director of FrC Consumer Protection Bureau)).
83 CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699, § 9 (Dec. 16, 2003).
84 Id. § 10(b).
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European Commission officials alluded that the U.S. passage of
the CAN-SPAM Act hampers efforts to form an international alli-
ance to combat spain because the Act fails to prohibit spam en-
tirely.85 The U.S. and the EU currently have opposing legislation
and will continue in such position until 2006, at least, when Con-
gress considers a global agenda. The EU Directive, enacted in the
fall of 2003, forbids email promotions unless the recipient gives
86the marketer prior consent. The EU holds the position that an
email account must enjoy privacy and thus requires businesses to
obtain explicit permission before sending email messages.87 To
effectively stop spam from systematically compromising the pri-
vacy of email users, Congress must take action to harmonize the
U.S. position on spain with that of the EU by supporting the "opt-
in" approach.
With the passage of the CAN-SPAM Act, states lose their
ability to regulate spain in a more restrictive manner than the fed-
eral law. Stripping the states of all legislative power in this area
essentially paralyzes an entire faction willing and able to contrib-
ute to the anti-spam effort. Louis Brandeis articulated one of the
most famous formulations in American law-that the states should
be free to serve as "laboratories" of democracy.88 He argued that
85 E-Privacy Directive: Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201)
37 (July 12, 2002) [hereinafter E-Privacy Directive]; see also Paul Meller, World Business
Briefing Europe: European Union: U.S. Help Sought on Spam, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, atWI.
86 E-Privacy Directive, supra note 85, at arts. 6(3), 13 (requiring the consent of recipients
to send direct marketing solicitations).
87 Id. 1 12 ("[Tlhis Directive is aimed at protecting the fundamental rights of natural per-
sons and particularly their right to privacy."); id. 40 ("Safeguards should be provided for sub-
scribers against intmsion of their privacy by unsolicited communications for direct marketing
purposes in particular by means of... emails."); see also Hansell, supra note 80.
88 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The pertinent portion of the dissent follows:
Yet the advances in the exact sciences and the achievements in invention re-
mind us that the seemingly impossible sometimes happens. There are many men
now living who were in the habit of using the age-old expression: "It is as impossi-
ble as flying." The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest
the value of the process of trial and error. In large measure, these advances have
been due to experimentation. In those fields experimentation has, for two centuries,
been not only free but encouraged. Some people assert that our present plight is due,
in part, to the limitations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social
and economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for betterment
there have been subjected otherwise. There must be power in the States and the Na-
tion to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to
meet changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or the States which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the
power to correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess productive ca-
pacity which have attended progress in the useful arts.
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the rational way to advance society was through "experimenta-
tion," the same process of trial and error used in the physical sci-
ences. 89  States must enjoy the freedom to craft laws above and
beyond those enacted at the federal level. With regard to spam,
the states are willing and able to contribute their legislative efforts;
thirty states enacted laws in an effort to resolve the spam prob-
lem. 90 California, for example, adopted an anti-spam law that re-
quired prior consumer consent ("opt-in") and allowed individuals
to sue spammers in the event of government inaction. 9' Given the
rapid pace of technological advance, Congress must provide states
with the authority to regulate spam above and beyond the federal
regulation, and allow states to utilize their resources to enforce
such laws.
The CAN-SPAM Act lacks a provision guaranteeing individu-
als a private right of action to allow for adequate enforcement.
Congress decided to take a top-down approach to enforcement by
focusing on the detainment and trial of a few kingpins in the spam
world.92  The top-down tactic supposedly acts to scare mid- and
low-level players into compliance. Even though ninety percent of
spam messages are sent from two hundred individuals,93 technol-
ogy changes so quickly that spammers can easily escape govern-
ment radar. Individuals must therefore have access to courts to
control spam.
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibil-
ity. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the
power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it
on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreason-
able. We have power to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the
Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.
But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect
our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we
must let our minds be bold.
Id.
89 id.; see Adam Cohen, Brandeis's Views on States' Rights, and Ice-Making, Have New
Relevance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, § 4, at 12.
90 See David E. Sorkin, Summary of State Spam Laws, at www.spamlaws.com/state/
summary.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
9' CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (2003).
92 See Hitt, supra note 15.
93 Saul Hansell, Finding Solution to Secret World of Spam, N.Y. TMES, May 2, §C, at 8.
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III. SOLUTION: A COMBINATION OF MARKET
AND LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
The eradication of spam will occur only through a compre-
hensive solution involving both market-based and legislative ini-
tiatives.
A. Market Forces
Market-based initiatives include self-help mechanisms and
spam filtering systems. 94 For self-help, email users can always use
the delete key or, under the CAN-SPAM Act, the "opt-out" mecha-
nism to eliminate spain from their in-boxes. 95 These tactics allow
users to get rid of unwanted emails only after receipt. On the other
hand, spam filtering software programs are designed to prevent
spam from penetrating in-boxes before receipt. One group esti-
mates that eighty percent of companies will install spam filters on
their email systems by the end of 2004, up from twenty percent in
November 2003.96 Due to the considerable amount of spam that
congests in-boxes, many software experts contend that the most
powerful way to clean in-boxes is to focus on identifying the le-
gitimate email and filtering it into users' in-boxes.97 Market forces
react much more quickly than legislatures and must necessarily
contribute to an effective answer to the spam problem.
Technical approaches alone are not enough to solve the spain
problem. Self-help mechanisms insufficiently accomplish the de-
sired goal of eliminating spam by wasting time and money and
allowing the invasion of privacy to occur before action is taken to
get rid of the spam. None of the filtering or blocking systems are
perfect either; they cost a substantial amount of money to imple-
ment, interfere with legitimate message traffic, allow spam to
penetrate in-boxes, and fail to relieve email users of the cost bur-
dens associated with spam.98 Further, spammers adapt their tech-
niques to circumvent filters and other anti-spam technologies.
Spammers have a substantial amount of time and resources to de-
vote to their activities, especially given the insignificant costs as-
sociated with sending spam. 99 Since market-based initiatives alone
cannot serve to relieve cost burdens and curb privacy invasions
94 Jones, supra note 9, at 72-73.
95 Id. at 72.
96 Saul Hansell, In War over Spam, One Company Is Happily Arming Both Sides, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2003, at C2.
97 Saul Hansell, Spam Fighters Turn to Identifying Legitimate Email, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2003, at CI.
98 Sorkin, supra note 79, at 344-50.
99 Id. at 356.
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entirely, protective legislation must accompany market forces in
realizing the goal of eliminating spam.
B. Protective Legislation
On the legislative side, Congress must prohibit the transmis-
sion of unsolicited commercial emails, provide individuals with a
private right of action, and reverse the preemption of state anti-
spam laws. A blanket prohibition of unsolicited emails requires
the informed consent of consumers before the transmission of any
spam message. This tactic ensures that individuals can enjoy their
right to privacy, while businesses can continue to use the email
system to send invited commercial messages. Arming individuals
with a private right of action strengthens enforcement and ade-
quately deters violations. Eradicating state preemption furnishes
states with an opportunity to experiment with anti-spam laws. The
junk fax law serves as a terrific model for this approach. The
European Directive on Electronic Commerce corresponds with this
method of regulation as well. By implementing the above sugges-
tions modeled after the junk fax law, individuals will enjoy their
right to privacy free from spam.
C. Junk Fax Law as a Model for Further Anti-Spam Legislation
Junk faxes present burdens similar to those stemming from
spam. Recipients of both types of unsolicited marketing tools ab-
sorb many of the costs, while the senders take on relatively mini-
mal expenses. For example, recipients of junk faxes provide the
paper and maintain the machine for the transmission of a message,
while recipients of spam supply the computer and support the ISP.
Furthermore, repeatedly sifting through numerous messages,
whether faxes or emails, takes up a significant amount of time,
causes a decline in productivity, and leads to additional mistakes.
Important messages can easily be overlooked in the case of faxes
or deleted in the case of emails. Given the obvious similarities,
effective solutions to the problems triggered from junk faxes and
spam can mirror each other.
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"),
more commonly known as the junk fax law, prohibits the use of
fax machines, computers, or other devices to send unsolicited ad-
vertisements to fax machines.1°° The law defines unsolicited ad-
vertisements as "material advertising the commercial availability
100Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2395
(codified at 47 U.S.C.S. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2003)) [hereinafter "TCPA"].
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or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted
to any person without that person's prior express invitation or
permission.'" 0' The junk fax law permits individuals to bring pri-
vate rights of action as long as state law does not expressly pro-
hibit such actions. 10 2 Congress also chose to avoid preemption in
the enactment of the federal junk fax law; the law allows states to
adopt more restrictive laws to prohibit the sending of unsolicited
advertisements to fax machines. 10 3 These provisions of the junk
fax law exemplify the means necessary to accomplish successful
results in the legislative fight against spain.
1. Junk Fax Law and Free Speech
Moreover, several courts have upheld the constitutionality of
the TCPA.'°4 First Amendment free speech claims have failed be-
cause the TCPA does not totally ban fax advertising. Instead, it
prohibits unsolicited advertising, which shifts advertising costs to
non-consenting consumers. 0 5 The differentiation between unsolic-
ited or unwanted pestering and invited or permitted soliciting leads
to a finding that the TCPA constitutionally regulates commercial
speech.
Courts applied the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion'0 6 to determine the constitutional validity of the TCPA. 0 7 The
Central Hudson test hinges on whether the restricted speech con-
cerns unlawful activity or contains misleading information.'0 8 If
the restricted speech does so, then the commercial speech does not
enjoy First Amendment protection. If not, then the court considers
whether there is a substantial government interest, whether the
regulation directly and materially advances such interest, and
whether it is not more restrictive than necessary to achieve such
interest. 1°9 Since the regulation of junk faxes does not deal with
102 Id. § 227(a)(4).
1021d. § 227(c)(5).03 1d. § 227(e)(i)(a).
104See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003); Destination Ventures
v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995), affig 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or. 1994); Texas v. Am. Blast
Fax, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 886 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
2003).
105 See Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56; Texas, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 1091; Kenro, 962 F.
Supp. at 1167; Kaufman, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 892.
'06 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
107 Missouri, 323 F.3d at 652; Destination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 55; Kenro, 962 F. Supp at
1167.
2o6 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
109Id.
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speech concerning unlawful activity or containing misleading in-
formation, courts employ the latter analytical framework.
a. Substantial Government Interest
The TCPA advances the substantial government interest of
protecting consumers from the costs imposed by unsolicited fax
advertisements. °10 Numerous state laws and the high costs ab-
sorbed by consumers support a finding of a substantial government
interest."' Approximately half of the states have considered laws
to prohibit unsolicited fax advertising, and unsolicited commercial
faxes cost Californians $17 million per year." 2 Although the junk
fax problem lacks substantial history and the TCPA fails to state
expressly a substantial government interest, the TCPA constitutes
a legitimate Congressional action to protect consumers from harm.
The role of Congress in the relationship between advertiser and
consumer is well-established,1 3 while the legislative history con-
tains sufficient testimonies outlining the real harms caused by un-
solicited faxes. 1 14 A Congressional subcommittee found that:
[A] [flestering problem [had] arisen from the so-called "junk
fax." Junk fax is more than merely irritating. It represents an
unfair shifting of the cost of advertising from the advertiser
to the unwitting customer .... [U]nsolicited and unwanted
faxes can tie up a machine for hours and thwart the receipt of
legitimate and important messages.' 15
Thus, the government has a substantial interest in protecting con-
sumers from the economic harms imposed by junk faxes as evi-
denced by the well-established role of Congress as an intermediary
between consumers and advertisers, the legislative history of the
TCPA, the widespread state action on the issue, and the heavy
costs imposed on consumers.
b. Direct and Material Advancement of Interest Through Regulation
When a substantial government interest is found, the court
must determine whether "the challenged regulation advances [the
110 Kaufman, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 914-15.
"'1Id. at 912.
112Id
"1id.
114 Destination Ventures v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995), afj'g 844 F. Supp. 632 (D. Or.
1994).
15 Kaufman, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 892 (quoting Telemarketing/Privacy Issues: Hearing on
H.R. No. 1304 and H.R. No. 1305 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 3-4 (1991); see also Missouri v. Am.
Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining the legislative history of the TCPA).
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government's] interests in a direct and material way."' 16 Given the
government's substantial interest in protecting consumers from the
economic harms inflicted through unsolicited commercial faxes,
the subsequent banning of such faxes directly advances that inter-
est. 1 7 The statutory focus on commercial faxes materially ad-
vances the government's substantial interest because commercial
faxes constitute the bulk of all unsolicited faxes.118
c. Narrowly Tailored Test
To satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson test, courts
must find:
[A] fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one
whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served,' that em-
ploys not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." 9
Plaintiffs generally propose alternative, less restrictive, means of
regulating junk faxes to prove that TCPA is too broad. Such alter-
natives include a do-not-fax list, limits on the sending of junk
faxes with respect to volume, frequency, and time of day, and an
"opt-out" mechanism. Advertisers under the TCPA, however, re-
main free to publicize their products or services through various
legal marketing techniques, such as the telephone, direct mail, or
in-person solicitation. 20  Fax advertisements differ from other
forms of advertising because of the costs they impose on recipi-
ents. 121 Television and newspaper ads are never unsolicited; the
access to such media requires an affirmative and voluntary action
on part of the recipient. Direct mail likewise does not impose
costs on recipients or interfere with the legitimate mail system.1
22
Furthermore, the requirement does not have to impose the "least
restrictive means" to comport with the narrowly tailored elements
of analysis.1 23 With consent, advertisers can continue to use the
fax machine as a mechanism to advertise products and services.
121
The TCPA's prohibition on unsolicited faxes is thus narrowly tai-
l 6 Id. at 637 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993)).
17 Id.
118 Missouri, 323 F.3d at 658.
" 
9 Id. at 659.
120 Id.
121 Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1168 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
122 Id.
123Id
.
124 Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 659 (8th Cir. 2003).
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lored to achieve the desired objective of protecting consumers
from the costs of unsolicited commercial faxes.
2. Comparative Analysis: Junk Faxes and Spam
Given the similarities between unsolicited commercial faxes
and unsolicited commercial emails, the TCPA serves as an excel-
lent model for spam regulation. Indeed, a federal anti-spam law
based on such a model would be a great improvement to the CAN-
SPAM Act. Even though Congress rightfully acknowledged the
government's substantial interest in protecting email users from
fraudulent and offensive emails and enacted legislation to curb the
most egregious forms of spam, the Act contains weaknesses in
several areas. The CAN-SPAM Act fails to curtail the invasion of
privacy imposed by spam, burdens individuals with the option to
refuse messages on a piecemeal basis, lacks adequate enforcement
mechanisms, shortsightedly preempts state law, and delays the im-
plementation of an internationally harmonized law. The TCPA
contains provisions that, when applied to spam, would serve to
strengthen the anti-spam legislation into a forceful piece of legisla-
tion capable of eradicating the widespread problem of spam. Such
provisions include an "opt-in" mechanism, a private right of ac-
tion, and an allocation of state's rights to supplement the federal
legislation. Furthermore, several courts have upheld the constitu-
tionality of the TCPA against free speech claims. 21 With the
adoption of the proposed changes to the CAN-SPAM Act, courts
will likely look to these cases for guidance and apply a similar le-
gal analysis. The TCPA thus functions as an excellent model upon
which Congress can draw to cure the weaknesses of the CAN-
SPAM Act and ensure its accordance with the First Amendment.
It must be noted, however, that the junk fax law serves primarily to
relieve commercial enterprises from unwittingly absorbing the
costs from unsolicited commercial fax messages, 26 while a suffi-
cient anti-spam law must deal with both cost and privacy issues
stemming from unsolicited commercial electronic messages. Nev-
ertheless, the junk fax law serves as a useful model.
CONCLUSION
Spam presents significant problems: It imposes the costs of
advertising on all participants in the electronic mail system and
'25 See supra note 104 (citing cases that have upheld the constitutionality of the TCPA).
12 6 See Kaufman v. ACS Sys., Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 886, 914 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2003)
("The TCPA directly and materially advances the stated interests, namely, preventing cost shift-
ing and permitting fax machine owners to control the operation of their machines.").
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invades the privacy of recipients. Congress enacted the CAN-
SPAM Act to alleviate email users from the burdens of spam, but
the Act fails to deal effectively with the problem. It allows spam-
mers to invade in-boxes and erode privacy, forces spam recipients
to take affirmative action to curtail future invasions, provides leni-
ent requirements and inadequate enforcement mechanisms, voids
stricter state anti-spam laws, and puts off a global solution. A
combination of market-based initiatives and protective legislation
will ensure a significant reduction in spam and the corresponding
invasion of privacy. Market-based initiatives have the aptitude to
thwart the rapid technological advances made by spammers. In
conjunction, protective legislation modeled after the junk fax law
would serve to halt cost-shifting and protect the privacy of indi-
viduals by eradicating spam. Such legislation overcomes the
weaknesses that currently taint the CAN-SPAM Act and comports
with First Amendment free speech guarantees. By barring the
transmission of unsolicited commercial email messages, giving
individuals a private right of action, and permitting states to enact
more stringent anti-spam legislation, individuals will enjoy their
right to privacy free from the offensive, obtrusive, and uninvited
plague that has infected the email system everywhere-spam.
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